






Choice of The Optimum Fiscal Rule  








Paper examines the problem of choice of an optimal fiscal rule in the long run. An 
ideal rule would typically assure fair distribution of utility over generations, while 
allowing to maintain the sustainable fiscal position. Three commonly used types: 
debt, deficit and expenditure rules are considered. The main conclusion is that 
only  the  modified  deficit  rule  fulfils  the  assumptions.  The  rule  requires  that 
government’s policy should aim at keeping the debt-to-GDP ratio constant over 
the economic cycle. The analysis is extended by taking into account the specific 
situation of the developing countries. An optimum fiscal constraint is then the 
Modified Golden Rule, according to which the public assets-to-GDP ratio should 
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Introduction 
One of the key issues in an intensive discussion over the fiscal policy in the last few years is 
the persistence of public finance deficit that has been observed in the majority of industrial 
countries. Many economists treat such a situation as a signal of an excessive looseness of 
public finances, posing threat to the medium-  and long  run financial sustainability. Data for 
years 1992-2003 indicates that a similar problem emerged in Poland – public finance deficit  
could be observed over the whole period. The phenomenon persisted even in the times of 
economic revival in the years 1995-1998, when the rapid growth of public income created an 
opportunity  to  achieve  surplus  and  public  debt  reduction,  which  would  leave  a  security 
margin for the following years. Economic downturn that has been observed since 2000 clearly 
revealed the problem of excessive expenditure as compared to the state financial capabilities. 
The excessive expenditures level imposed the necessity to reduce them drastically under the 
recession conditions, that is when economic theory suggests rather an expansionary policy.  
The above mentioned problems indicate an urgent need to subordinate the fiscal policy to the 
defined  medium-  and  long  run  objectives.  One  of  such  ways  is  introducing  appropriate 
institutional solutions which will help to confine the expenditure growth and increase the 
awareness the intertemporal public sector budget  constraint among the policymakers. The 
significance of institutional factors influencing the fiscal policy is supported by the research 
of such authors as von Hagen (1992), Alesina, Perotti (1994), (1996), Alesina  et al. (1996), 
Milesi-Ferretti (1997), mainly based on international comparisons. Alesina, Perotti (1994) and 
Milesi-Fereti (1997) define the fiscal institutions as all the rules and regulations according to 
which  budgets  are  drafted,  approved  and  implemented.  The  above  mentioned  statistical 
research indicate that such factors as strong prerogatives given to the Minister of Finance, a 
limited range of parliamentary amendments to the budget act or the procedures limiting the 
flexibility of budget execution may contribute to decrease of deficit.  
In the cited papers fiscal policy rules are mentioned among the most important institutions, 
that,  if  properly  constructed,  may  have  strong  influence  on  fiscal  policy.  Milesi-Ferretti 
defines the fiscal policy rules as all the constraints imposed on deficit, public debt or spending 
levels that influence budget drafting or execution. Kopits and Symansky [1997] additionally 
assume that a crucial condition is the permanent character of the constraint. Though this last 
assumption  is  not  necessary,  in  this  study    the  permanent  character  of  the  fiscal  rules  is 
assumed.   3
Discussion over applying rules in economic policy has been present in the economic literature 
for a long time. Among the earliest arguments for “rules rather than discretion” is the research 
of  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1997)  concerning  the  time  inconsistency  problem.  One  of  the 
arguments for applying rules is the problem of “long and variable lags” between an event (e.g 
recession)  and  the  policy  reaction  if  the  discretionary  framework  is  applied  (see:  Siglitz 
[1988]). Another argument has been raised in the context of fiscal policy under the currency 
union - common currency allows for shifting consequences of irresponsible fiscal policy to 
other countries. In this situation the existence of rules may provide the necessary coordination 
of policy conducted by the member countries. Under the Economic and Monetary Union such 
a role is fulfilled by the Maastricht fiscal criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. The 
analysis ofproblems connected with conducting fiscal policy under economic union can be 
found in the study by Brunila, Buti and Franco [2001]. 
The last argument for rules in fiscal policy is connected with the new political economy. 
Theoretical and empirical research show that in democratic countries fiscal policy suffer from 
bias towards excessive expenditure and deficit levels, which in unfavourable conditions may 
even lead to the country’s insolvency. An overview of theoretical models explaining roots of 
this phenomenon can be found in Alesina and Perotti [1994]. Imposing adequate rules may 
limit the scope of this phenomenon, forcing the politicians to conduct fiscal policy that is 
close to the social optimum in the long run. 
On the other hand, arguments for discretionary policy stress that it is hard to define a rule 
which  would  both  comply  with  the  long-term  economic  policy  objectives  and  allow  for 
reaction to shocks. According to some opinions, though rules have their advantages, excessive 
restrictions  may  hamper  an  effective  anti-cyclical  economic  policy.  This  argument  is 
especially important as related to EMU, where introducing the common currency caused the 
fiscal instruments to remain the only means of demand stabilization. 
A  significant  part  of  discussion  over  fiscal  rules  concerns  the  problem  of  choice  of  an 
optimum fiscal rule.  Requirements concerning an optimum fiscal rule have been analysed by 
Kopits, Symansky [1998] and Buiter [2003].
2 They can be divided into three main groups.  
                                                 
2 Most of the analyses refer to the conditions of developed countries. Notable exceptions here, with reference 
given to the specific features of developing countries, are papers by Buiter and Grafe [2002], Coricelli, Ercolani 
[2002] and Perry [2002].    4
·  An optimum fiscal rule should efficiently influence the fiscal policy. It means that 
among others it should be simple, and the accordance of policy with rule should be 
evident and easy to control. 
·  The accepted rule should comply with the defined long run objectives.  
·  It  should  also  enable  efficient  anti-cyclical  policy  –  allow  for  increasing  budget 
deficit during a recession and force its reduction (or an occurrence of surplus) during 
upswings.  
The analysis presented in this paper concentrates on long-term aspects of optimum fiscal rule 
choice. This article aims to study which fiscal rules may be applied in a long run and which of 
them  to  the  greatest  extent  contributes  to  increasing  social  welfare.  The  basic  model  is 
developed  by  including  the  existence  of  public  capital,  which  allows  to  account  for  the 
distinctive features of developing countries, such as higher public investment needs. 
Section one of the study defines the structure and assumptions of the examined model of 
public income and expenditure. The objective of section two is to answer what expenditure 
and deficit level provide solution that is optimal in the long run. In section three possible 
reasons  for  which  the  real  fiscal  policy  may  in  reality  deviate  from  optimum  are  briefly 
examined. Section four is an attempt to compare the results of applying particular fiscal rules 
in the long run perspective. The two subsequent sections present the extension of model, 
taking  into  account  the  role  of  public  capital  in  decisions  concerning  fiscal  policy.    This 
extension enables the choice of an optimum fiscal rule given one of the specific features of 
developing  economies  -  high  investment  needs.  The  last  section  presents  summary 
conclusions that emerge from the analysis. 
1.  Assumptions of the model 
A range of simplifying assumptions was introduced in the following analysis. The aim of 
these simplifications is to emphasize those aspects of fiscal policy which refer to the long run 
aspects. 
·  State income and expenditure are income and expenditure of the consolidated public 
sector, without distinction between central budget, extrabudgetary funds and local 
governments.   5
·  Public debt includes all public liabilities, including risk-weighted guarantees. The 
debt is denominated in local currency and bears interest according to the fixed long-
run interest rate. The distinction between net and gross debt is omitted here – these 
two categories are treated as identical.  
·  Full  transparency  of  fiscal  policy  is  assumed,  which  means  inability  to  apply 
“creative accounting” techniques. Consequent on that, formal accordance of fiscal 
policy with a given rule equals its actual accordance. A broader analysis of influence 
of transparency on applying the fiscal rules is presented by Milesi-Feretti [2000]. 
·  The  problem  of  who  imposes  the  fiscal  rule  is  omitted  here.  It  may  be  e.g.  the 
parliament  which  obliges  the  government  to present the budget draft which is in 
accordance  with  the  rule.  Fiscal  rules  may  also  take  the  form  of  self-constraints 
imposed by the government – their objective may in this case be decreasing risk 
connected with possible state’s insolvency. 
·  This study emphasizes examining long-term consequences of various types of fiscal 
policy,  thus  effects  connected  with  the  business  cycle  are  omitted.  In  the 
consequence of such approach, all presented variables should be interpreted as net of 
cyclical effects. It is assumed that within the full business cycle the sum of cyclical 
effects is zero. 
It is assumed that primary government expenditure (i.e. expenditure net of interest on public 
debt) are the source of social utility associated with the existence of public sector. Primary 
expenditure  (in  real  terms)  G  consist  of  transfers  to  the  private  sector  GT,  government 
consumption GC and capital expenditure (investment) GI, so that: G = GT + GC + GI .
3 Nominal 
values obtained by multiplying real values by prices level P; in the long run prices increase at 
the  constant  rate
4  p = P / P ￿ .  Total public expenditure consists of primary expenditure and 
public debt service costs equal to the product of debt B and the nominal interest rate (r + p), 
where r is the real interest rate. 
                                                 
3 All variables are assumed to be of the class at least c
(2) at least. A convention is assumed in which the variable 
X(t) is substituted by X. Where it is not explicite stated that a variable is a fixed parameter, it should be assumed 
that it may be a certain function of time. Notation  x ￿  denotes the growth of variable, i.e. t / x x ¶ ¶ = ￿ , where t 
denotes time. The relative level of variable X denotes its ratio to the gross domestic product.  
4 In the further analysis symbol  x ￿ denotes marginal increase, so  t / x x ¶ ¶ = ￿  holds, where t stands for time.   6
The source of expenditure financing is tax income T, being the product of gross domestic 
product Y and a flat tax rate t. In the long term income rises at a constant real rate n, the same 
as the long-term real growth rate of GDP. Thus, the nominal GDP and nominal income (PT) 
rise in the long run with the rate (n + p). The difference between total real expenditure and 
income equals the deficit D: D = G + rB – T, financed by loans drawn on the capital market. 
Nominal deficit PD equals the increase of nominal public debt PB: t / PB PD ¶ ¶ = . It can be 
shown that real debt growth equals the difference between the real deficit and debt reduction 
caused by inflation:  B D B p - = ￿ . 
The equation of movement of the public debt, being a dynamic form of intertemporal budget 
constraint is then: 
(1)  T rB G B - + = ￿ . 
Crucial for subsequent analysis is the assumption that the considered state is solvent in the 
long run. Buiter [1998] shows that necessary and sufficient condition for solvency is that the 
average long-run public debt growth rate is lower that the average long-run interest rate. In 
the other words, it is assumed that the country does not finance its expenditure by loans drawn 
to cover the costs of servicing the previous ones, or does not use Ponzi financing. Formally 
this condition can be written as  
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Transforming the equation of movement of the public debt we arrive at  rB B T G - = - ￿ . By 
multiplying both sides by factor 
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-  and integrating we arrive at: 
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Substituting  (2)  to  (4)  and  subsequently  to  (3),  we  arrive  at  the  long-term  form  of 
intertemporal budget constraint: 
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where b(0) is the initial level of public debt (in period t = 0). Thus, the long-run budgetary 
constraint is satisfied if the sum of future discounted income T is sufficient to finance the sum 
of future discounted primary expenditure G and the initial public debt level B(0). 
2.  Choice of the optimum fiscal policy 
In this section an attempt is made to define the optimal fiscal policy, which can be the point of 
reference in the later part of analysis, for the assessment of the specific fiscal rules. Two 
alternative  criteria  are  considered:  one  based  on  standard  utility  function  and  the  other, 
simplified, based on the assumption concerning the constant share of expenditure in GDP. 
The policy which fulfils the optimality criterion and satisfied also the intertemporal budget 
constraint, will be referred to as socially optimal fiscal policy.  
(i)  The utility function-based approach 
This approach assumes that the objective of fiscal policy in the analysed model is maximizing 
long-run  social  utility  of  government  expenditure UG, equal the sum of future discounted 





G G dt e ) t ( u U ,  where  ￿ > 0  is  the  discount  rate  of  future 
utility.  It  is  assumed  that  momentary  utility  uG(t)  is  the  growing  function  of  the  primary 
government expenditure, with decreasing marginal utility. In the presented model we assume 
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The optimalisation problem is to find the expenditure path G(t) that maximizes (6), while 
satisfying the budgetary constraint (5) (or its dynamic form (1)). To obtain the solution the 
Pontriagin’s extremum rule is applied, here cited after Tokarski [2001]. This method is to a 
great extent analogous with a more common Lagrange’s procedure of finding the conditional 
extremum. Its basic instrument is the current-value Hamiltonian  B ￿ ) t ( u H G ￿ + = , which in 
this case equals: 
                                                 
5  It  should  be  noticed  that  at  values of parameter ￿ close to 1 the utility function CRRA converges to the 
logarithmic utility function.   8











where q is a price being an equivalent of Lagrange’s l multiplier. The optimal path G(t) has 
to fulfil the following necessary conditions: 
(8)  0 ￿ G G / H = + = ¶ ¶
n - , 
(9)  ￿ ￿￿ ￿r ￿￿ B / H ￿ = + - = + ¶ ¶ - , 
(10)  B T G rB ￿ / H ￿ = - + = ¶ ¶ , 
and the transversality condition 
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It  follows  from  (8)  that  ￿ G - =
n - .  It  can  easily  be  shown  that  the  multiplier  q  must  be 
negative and  ￿ / ￿ ) G / G ( ￿ ￿ - = n  holds. From the equation (9) it follows that the multiplier q 
grows with the fixed rate  ) ￿ r ( ￿ ￿ / ￿ + - = ￿ , thus: 
(12)  n - = / ) ￿ r ( G / G ￿ . 
It has been shown that the expenditure G grows in the long run with the fixed rate equal the 
difference between real interest rate and discount rate, multiplied by the parameter ￿. Thus, 
the differential equation defines a group of expenditure paths. If we assume that at the period 
0  the  primary  expenditure  amounts  to  G(0),  then  solving  the  equation  yields 
t ) / ) ￿ r (( e ) 0 ( G ) t ( G
n - = . It may be shown that the transversality condition is fulfilled for each 
path, since: 
(13)  0 e )) 0 ( G / 1 ( lim e e )) 0 ( G / 1 ( lim ￿e lim
rt
t












which is always true if the long-run real interest rate is positive. 
The  next  step  is  to  choose  such  an  expenditure  growth  path  G(t)  which  satisfies  the 
intertemporal  budget  constraint  (5).  Basing  on  the  assumptions  we  know  that  income  T 
increases with the fixed rate equal the GDP growth rate: 
nt e ) 0 ( T ) t ( T = . From the previous 
considerations we also know that the expenditure G increases with the fixed rate  n - / ) ￿ r ( . It 
should be noticed that if the government expenditure and product growth rate differed in the 
very  long  term  (with  t￿ ￿),  the  share  of  government  expenditure  in  the  product  would 
increase to 100% or decrease to 0. In actual economies this tendency cannot be observed in   9
the  long  run, hence, it can be assumed that, at least in the long run, the growth rates of 
primary expenditure and product are equal. It means that  n G / G lim
t =
¥ ®
￿ must hold. However, 
since the expenditure growth rate G that maximizes the long-run social utility is constant, the 
equation  n / ) ￿ r ( = n -  holds in each period. Therefore, the budget constraint can be defined 
as: 
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Let us define the relative public primary expenditure level g as its ratio to the gross domestic 
product: g = G/Y. It follows from the previous considerations that the expenditure increases in 
the  long  run  with  the  same  rate  as  GDP,  hence  this  relation  is  constant,  i.e.  g(t) ￿ g(0) . 
Similarly, the relative tax level ￿ is equal to the ratio of T to GDP. In relative categories the 











Thus, the relative primary expenditure level that maximizes the social utility, which at the 
same time satisfies the budget constraint (the socially optimal level) equals: 
(17)  ) 0 ( b ) n r ( ￿ g
*
S - - = . 
Let us analogically define the relative debt and deficit level b and d, respectively, as its share 
of GDP. As it was shown earlier,  t - p + + = b ) r ( g d  holds, therefore the socially optimal 
deficit level is given by: 
(18)  b ) ￿ n ( d
*
S + = . 
Thus, it equals the product of the relative public debt level and the nominal rate of economic 
growth. It may be proved that the socially optimal fiscal policy means setting the expenditure 
and deficit in such a way that the ratio of public debt to GDP remains constant. It follows 
from  the  previous  considerations  that  B D B p - = ￿ .  Using  the derivative formula, we may 
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Thus, it holds: 
(20)  b ) ￿ n ( d b + - = ￿ . 
The  above  formula  means  that  the  growth  of  the  relative  level  of  public  debt  equals  the 
relative deficit, net of product of debt level and nominal economic growth rate. Comparison 
of  the  formulas  (18)  and  (20)  demonstrates  that  if  the  government  conducts  the  socially 
optimal fiscal policy that maximizes the social utility, then the public debt remains constant 
(i.e.  0 b = ￿ ) in relation to GDP.  
As an example let us assume a relative initial public debt level of 40% and an average tax rate 
￿ = 40%.  The  long-run  real  economic  growth  rate  is  2%,  the  nominal is 4% and the real 
interest  rate  equals  4%.  In  such  case  the  socially  optimal  (fixed)  deficit  level  will  be 
% 6 , 1 % 40 % 4 b ) ￿ n ( d
*
S = * = + = . The corresponding long-run share of primary expenditure 
in product will be  % 2 , 39 b ) r ( d g
*
S = p + - + t = , and the share of overall expenditure will be 
% 2 , 39 b ) r ( d g
*
S = p + - + t = . At these levels of expenditure and deficit the public debt will 
remain at the constant relative level 40%.  
 
(ii)  The simplified approach 
It appears that the approach based on the utility function is characterized by considerable 
limitations. First, the chosen utility function considerably affects the result. In most cases it is 
arbitrary and does not have to reflect the real social preferences. Moreover, as it was proved, 
to find a reasonable long-run solution we need to make a strong assumption with values of 
parameters ￿ so that the long-run expenditure growth rate equals GDP growth rate. 
For these reasons an alternative approach to the optimality problem might be suggested. It is 
based on the a priori assumption that socially optimal fiscal policy should be characterized by 
a  constant  share  of  utility  (primary)  public  expenditure  in  the  gross  domestic  product 
(g=const.). Let us now analyse what consequences the above assumption implies for the long 
run variables paths such as the deficit or public debt. 
According to the definition of deficit and equation (20), the following identity holds: 
(21)  ) g ( b ) n r ( b - t + - = ￿ .   11
With  then  assumption  that  the  long  run  interest  rate  and  the  economic  growth  rate  are 
different and constant, it is a differential equation. According to Chiang [1984] the solutions 
of this equation is expressed by: 
(22) 
t ) n r ( e
n r
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As  presented  earlier,  maintaining  solvency  in  the  long  run  does  not  require  fulfilling  the 
condition (2). Comparing it with the above formula we may prove that the country is solvent 
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holds. Since in the typical case
6 r > n, the above condition is satisfied only when the second 
component equals 0, i.e. when  ) n r )( 0 ( b g - = t - . As the equation (21) shows, it is true only 
when  0 b = ￿ . Thus, the ratio of the primary expenditure to GDP may be maintained at the 
fixed level only when the relative level of the public debt also remains fixed, so the socially 
optimum level of deficit in this case equals  b ) ￿ n ( d
*
S + = . The result is the same as the one 
obtained in the case of the utility function based approach. 
Under the fixed relative state income, it implies that the ratio of service costs to GDP has to 
be fixed, therefore the relative deficit level fulfilling the assumption has to be equal to the 
product of the ratio of public debt to GDP and the nominal economic growth rate. This result 
is identical with the one achieved under the assumption based on the utility function.  
To summarize, in both cases it was proved that the socially optimal government policy is 
based on maintaining the fixed relative deficit d at the level equal to the product of public debt 
level in relation to GDP and the nominal GDP growth rate. As a result of such a policy the 
ratio of the public debt value to GDP will remain at the fixed level. 
3.  Reasons and consequences of the excessive deficit 
This section concentrates on the analysis of long run consequences of the case in which the 
real deficit deviates from what is defined as socially optimal. With given tax income, it is 
                                                 
6 As Romer [1996] indicates, assuming that the long run interest rate is higher than the long run economic 
growth rate is equal to assumption that the analysed economy is dynamically efficient in the long run.    12
synonymous with a situation in which the current expenditure level is higher than the one 
providing the maximization of the long run social utility. Milesi-Ferretti [1997] indicates that 
such a phenomenon is relatively common in democratic countries. Although the analysis of its 
origins goes beyond this study, it is worth mentioning at least several possible causes of the 
deficit bias. 
·  Models  of  fiscal illusion suggest that the government, instead of maximizing the 
social welfare, can be driven by maximizing the possibility of winning the election. 
In the case in which the society does not fully realize the long run consequences of 
the chosen policy, it may lead to votes “buying” which causes the deficit to increase 
above the optimum level. 
·  According to models that treat debt as a strategic variable, the existing public debt is 
a variable which has an impact on behaviour of the future governments, thus the 
existing  government  may  to  a  certain  extent  use  the  deficit  to  shape  the  desired 
resources allocation. 
·  A conflict between social groups of interest (e.g. political parties) often leads to lags 
in introducing reforms which aim at reducing the growth of expenditure. 
·  Models  that  put  the  emphasis  on  the  problem  of  wealth  redistribution  between 
generations may suggest that the generation which is currently in power will favour 
the current expenditures as opposed to the future ones.  
Let  us  assume  that  the  objectives  of  the  government’s  activity  may  diverge  from  the 
objectives of the society as a whole. On the one hand, the government strives to satisfy the 
electors who aim at maximizing the utility in the long run. On the other hand, it may believe 
that there is a possibility of gaining popularity and chances to be re-elected by increasing the 
current expenditure. Let the government’s objective be minimising the loss function 
(24)  d ) d (d L
2 *
S 2
1 j - - = , 
where ￿ > 0 represents a relative importance the government attaches to the efforts of gaining 
popularity  by  increasing  the  current  expenditure  and,  consequently,  the  deficit.  If  this 
importance is close to 0, then the activities of fiscal authorities are concentrated on achieving 
the socially optimal solution. The deficit level minimizing the given loss function is  
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Thus,  the  greater  impact  on  maximizing  the  current  government  expenditure  causes  the 
excessive deficit. As a consequence of maintaining such a deficit the debt trap (Ponzi-type 
outcome) occurs. It should be noticed that 
*
S d  defines the maximal level at which the relative 
public debt level will not increase in a certain period. Increasing the deficit above this level by 
a fixed value ￿ causes the debt to increase unlimitedly. Even if it is possible to maintain the 
excessive deficit for a certain period, such policy will end up with the country’s insolvency, 
with all its subsequent negative consequences. 
The  excessive  deficit  as  it  is  presented  above  does  not  satisfy  the  intertemporal  budget 
constraint.  However,  we  can  imagine  an  alternative  situation  where  despite  an  excessive 
deficit, the relative debt level does not increase in an unlimited way. It has to be assumed that 
there exists a mechanism constraining the maximal deficit level. The source of this constraint 
may the capital markets, the participants of which assess the policy and, being driven by 
rational  expectations,  refuse  to  finance  under  the  debt  trap  conditions.  In  the  presented 
analysis  it  is  assumed  that  in  the  long  run  such  mechanism  imposes  a  constraint  on  the 
country’s financing and thus the long run relative deficit level cannot be endlessly high. Let 
us assume that this constraint is known and fixed in categories of the deficit-to-GDP ratio and 
equals  F d ˆ . In this situation, the real deficit level will be  ) d ˆ , d min( d F
*
B = . To simplify it, let us 
assume here that ￿ is high enough so that  F
*
S d ˆ d <  always holds. 
7 Let us also assume that 
financial markets would be able to provide the deficit financing, given that the deficit remains 
on the socially optimal level, which can be expressed as  F
*
S d ˆ d < . 
Consequently, the relative budget deficit will remain at the fixed level  F d ˆ , which causes the 
fixed debt growth. It may be proved that, unlike in the previously considered example, the 
debt growth is not explosive this time. According to the equation (20), the growth of relative 
debt level equals the difference between the relative deficit and the product of relative debt 
and  nominal  GDP  growth  rate.  As  the  debt  rises,  the  difference  decreases,  which  causes 
slowdown of the growth of the relative debt level. In a very long run (with t￿ ￿) this growth 
                                                 
7 This assumption does not affect the generality of the solution. If at a period t=0 this condition is not satisfied, 
then such a situation leads to growth of the relative public debt level. This, in turn, causes the growth of the 
socially optimal debt level b
*
S  and consequently growth of  b
*
B as well. Hence, there exists such a period t’ for 
which for each t > t’ the discussed condition will be satisfied.   14
converges to 0:  0 ) b ) ￿ n ( d ˆ ( lim F t = + -
¥ ® . The public debt in ratio to GDP will asymptotically 
converge towards the following equilibrium level: 
(26)  ) ￿ n /( d ˆ b ˆ
F L + = . 
To  illustrate  the  discussed  process,  a  simple  simulation  was  carried  out.  Macroeconomic 
parameters of the model economy were assumed to be the same as in the previous numerical 
example. Moreover, it was assumed that the maximal deficit level  F d ˆ  possible to finance in 
the long run is 3% of GDP. Paths of the most important fiscal variables (the public debt, 
deficit and public expenditure g) are presented in Figure 1. 
Fig. 1 The results of simulation of public debt (b), deficit(d) and primary expenditure (g)  
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Source: author’s calculations 
* LS (RS) denotes the variable presented on the left (right) scale.  
Let us assume that the relative deficit during the whole simulation period is constant and 
equals  % 3 d ˆ
F = . This level exceeds the socially optimal deficit value which, as it was proved 
in the previous example, initially equals 1,65% of GDP. The excessive deficit causes the 
relative public debt level to rise asymptomatically towards the long run level  % 75 b ˆ
L = . As 
Fig. 1 presents, during the analysed period of 50 years the variable reaches the approximate 
level of about 70% of GDP. The public debt growth causes the relative expenditure level to 
vary  and  deviate  from  the  optimal  path.  Initially  the  expenditure  share  in  GDP  was 
% 6 , 40 b ) r ( d ˆ g F = p + - + t = , so it was higher than the optimum 39%, however it decreases   15
with time when the interest on the increasing debt rises. In a very long run the expenditure 
level asymptotically converges towards  % 5 , 38 gL = , a level that is lower than the one which 
would be the result of the socially optimal fiscal policy. 
To summarize, it appears that the discussed case concerning the excessive deficit gives a 
limited long run solution and does not result in debt trap. However, it does not mean that such 
practices  are  optimal  since  the  assumed  deficit  differs  from  the  optimum  solution  by  the 
difference of 
*
S F d d ˆ - = d . Pursuing the policy of constant excessive deficit means that a part 
of future consumption is replaced by the current one. The higher current expenses cause an 
additional  debt  growth  which  in  the  future  will  cause  a  growth  of  interest  payments  and 
decrease of consumption. Such a policy causes the social utility level to decrease. 
4.  Comparison of fiscal policy rules 
As  it  was  mentioned  at  the  beginning,  institutional  factors  can  play  an  important  role  in 
shaping fiscal policy, as well as reducing the excessive deficit. The cited authors mention the 
fiscal  policy  rules  among  the  most  important  institutions.  Applying  these  rules  aims  at 
obliging the government to conduct a policy which would be closest to the socially optimal 
one.  
The subject of this section is an attempt to compare some most common types of fiscal rules 
and  their  optimality  in  the  long  run.  There  can  be  at  least  several  criteria  of  the  rules 
assessment - the detailed list can be found among others in papers by Inman [1996], Kopits 
and Symansky [1998], Buti, Giudice [2002] or Buiter [2003]. Here we will concentrate on 
only two criteria which are chosen because of their crucial long run importance. These are: 
·  compliance of a given rule with the socially optimal solution, 
·  simplicity and convenience of application, including also immunity to the lack of 
complete and detailed information. 
The importance of the first criterion was discussed earlier in this study - the primary objective 
of the application of fiscal rules is to change the current fiscal policy to bring it at least a little 
closer  to  the  socially  optimal  one.  The  second  criterion  has  only  a  technical  character, 
however in practice it may turn out to be crucial. In the light of this condition one should 
favour a rule the application of which requires the knowledge of only one or two observable   16
parameters,  instead  of  a  rule  which  demands  detailed  long  run  forecasts  of  a  number  of 
economic variables.  
First of the rules discussed is the deficit rule, according to which the deficit in a given period 
should not exceed a certain level. As its most common version says, the deficit should in no 
period exceed a certain fixed level, expressed as a percent of GDP.
8 
(27)  R d ˆ d £ . 
According  to  earlier  considerations  (see  equation  (18)),  the  deficit  level  which  meets  the 
requirements of the socially optimal policy is: 
(28)  b ) n ( d ˆ
R p + = . 
In the light of the discussed model, accepting any other deficit level would be sub-optimal in 
the long run. The constraint set at the level higher than the product of nominal growth rate and 
relative debt level would favour, from the point of view of the social utility, too much the 
current consumption . Introducing a constraint which is too low (e.g. the balanced budget 
rule) would, in turn, lead to an excessive reduction of the current consumption in favour of its 
future level. 
However, applying such a rule involves some difficulties in practice. Though the public debt 
value in relation to GDP is known, it is often hard to define the long run GDP growth rate. 
Defining a rate which is too high will lead in an extreme case ( and the lack of corrective 
actions) to an explosive path of deficit and the debt trap. It is connected with the fact that in 
such a case the deficit would be defined by the formula  b d b ) ￿ n ( d
*
S n + = n + + = , where ￿ 
denotes error in the assessment of the long run rate growth. With ￿ > 0 the deficit would equal 
*
S d   value  which  provides  the  stabilization  of  public  debt,  increased  by  a  certain  value 
proportional to the relative debt level. The effect of policy conducted according to such a rule 
would be an accelerating debt growth.  
A way to avoid this problem would be defining in the period t = 0 the deficit ceiling 
*
S d  which 
could  not  be  corrected  when  the  relative  debt  level  changed.  In  a  case  when 
*
S R d d ˆ >   an 
                                                 
8 According to the optimal rule the deficit should , in fact, be exactly equal to the product of nominal growth rate 
and  the  relative  debt.  However,  it  may  be  assumed  that  the  government  has  no  reasons  to  pursue  a  more 
restrictive  policy  than  it  is  acceptable  (the  lower  deficit  policy).  Thus,  a  more  practical  deficit  ceiling  is 
sufficient.   17
identical situation would occur as in the case of setting the ceiling at  F d ˆ . The relative debt 
level would start to rise, approaching asymptotically the new equilibrium level compliant with 
the higher deficit. In a case where 
*
S R d d ˆ <  the relative debt would asymptotically decrease 
towards the new, lower long run level. Although such a solution allows to avoid the debt trap 
problem,  still  its  effectiveness  concerning  achieving  the  main  objective,  i.e.  the  socially 
optimal policy, depends on the knowledge of the long run economic growth rate. Applying 
the deficit rule leads to the socially optimal solution only when in the period t = 0 the rate is 
estimated correctly.  
The modified deficit rule is devoid of these drawbacks. According to this rule in each period 
the deficit should be set at the level which causes the relative debt level to remain constant: 
(29) 
'
R d ˆ d £ , where  0 b : d ˆ '
R = ￿  
Applying this rule does not require knowledge of the long run parameters. It only requires a 
constant monitoring of the debt level and current corrections of expenditure so that the public 
debt-to- GDP ratio remains constant. This solution, with the assumption that the monitoring 
system is efficient enough, allows to achieve the socially optimal fiscal policy, without any 
risk in the long run.  
This rule is, in fact, similar to another widely used class of fiscal rules – public debt rules. 
Their typical version assumes that the debt level should not exceed a certain defined value. 
Most often the marginal debt value is defined in relative categories, i.e. as a percentage of 
GDP:  
(30)  R b ˆ b £ . 
According to the earlier considerations, this rule should provide the socially optimal policy 
only when the maximal debt level is defined at the initial level, i.e.  ) 0 ( b b ˆ
R = . A rule defined 
in such a way is identical with the presented modified deficit rule .  
In practice, however, the maximal public debt level is often defined at the level which is 
higher than the current one, i.e.  ) 0 ( b b ˆ
R > . An example may be the solution applied in Poland, 
according to which the public debt level should not exceed 60% of GDP, while the current 
debt level is about 50% of GDP.
9 Setting the debt ceiling at a level other than the current one 
                                                 
9 At the end of year 2002, source: Ministry of Finance   18
does not comply with the optimality requirement. It is easiest to trace it on the following 
numerical example. 
All economy parameters are assumed at the same level as in the simulation presented earlier. 
It was assumed that there exist a fiscal rule, according to which the public debt cannot exceed 
the level  % 60 b ˆ
R = . Time paths of the most important fiscal variables in the simulation are 
presented in Figure 2. 
Fig. 2 Results of simulation of public debt (b), deficit (d) and public expenditure (g)  
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Source: author’s calculations 
As long as the public debt does not exceed the 60% of GDP, trajectories of all the above fiscal 
variables are identical with the ones presented in the earlier simulation. As soon as the relative 
level of the public debt reaches 60%, there is a necessity for sharp reduction of the deficit 
from the initial 3% of GDP to the new, lower level  % 4 , 2 b ˆ ) n ( d R L = p + = , which allows to 
stabilize of the public debt on  R b ˆ level. It means the necessity to cut the expenditure to the 
level of  % 8 , 38 b ˆ ) r ( d g R L L = p + - + t = . This level is higher than in the fully unrestricted 
case (expenditure on the level of 38,5% of GDP), while still lower than the one which is the 
result of the socially optimal policy (39,2%).  
We should notice yet another aspect connected with applying this rule, though it goes beyond 
the framework of the presented simple model. This rule brings the pursued policy closer to the 
socially  optimal  solution,  however,  it  occurs  at  cost  of  necessity  of  sharp  cut  of  the   19
expenditure , thus disturbing its smooth path. As Belka [2003] indicates, this correction is 
very socially costly and may lead to abandonment of the rule , which undermines its sense.  
The expenditure rules
10 are the last analyzed category. Such typical rule assumes that the 
country’s expenditure will not rise at the rate higher than a certain ceiling value. It most often 
concerns the overall expenditure of the public sector GT, given by  B ) r ( G GT p + + = . As 
previously,  we  assume  that  the  government  is  willing  to  use  the  possibility  to  increase 
expenditure, provided that this action does not violate the rule. According to this assumption, 
the expenditure will actually rise at the ceiling rate. If the rate was different from the nominal 
GDP growth rate, the ratio of the government expenditure to GDP in the long run would 
decrease to 0 or rise to 100% level. Maintaining the approximate share of the government 
sector expenditure in GDP requires the rate of the nominal expenditure growth to be precisely 
equal to the long run GDP nominal growth rate. Therefore, the rule of expenditure concerning 
the long run is expressed as: 
(31)    p + £ n G / G T T ￿ . 
Whether or not the so defined rule will guarantee the socially optimal policy will depend on 
the deficit level in the period 0. Setting the fixed rate of expenditure growth means that in the 
long run the ratio of GT to GDP will remain constant. The fixed tax rate means the fixed 
relative deficit level. Thus, the long run effect of the rule allows to maintain the fixed relative 
deficit at the same level as in the period t = 0. Therefore, if initially the deficit is at the 
socially optimal level, then the result of applying the expenditure rule will be the socially 
optimal solution in the long run. If this condition is fulfilled, then the result of the fixed 
relative deficit will be convergence of the relative public debt to a certain new long run level, 
calculated analogically as in the equation (26). This solution is not socially optimal, however 
it allows to avoid the debt trap situation – in a very long run it leads to the stabilization of the 
relative public debt level. 
In the case of the expenditure rule, it is crucial to choose the right nominal rate of expenditure 
growth. Even minor deviations of the rate from the long run product growth rate cause (if no 
corrections are made) a rapid growth or decrease of the relative expenditure level to the level 
of 100% or 0%, respectively.  
                                                 
10 A broader analysis concerning the practical aspects of applying the expenditure rules is presented by Mills and 
Quinet [2001].   20
To avoid this problem, the modified expenditure rule may be applied, according to which 
the rate of expenditure growth should equal a certain moving average of the past expenditure 
growth rates. The advantage of this rule may be not evident enough in the presented model, 
since the long run rate of economic growth is fixed and known here. However, in practice it is 
hard to predict, which is especially important in such countries as Poland, where the available 
time series are short. Applying the modified expenditure rule eliminates the problem to a great 
extent as it only requires the knowledge of historical data. It does not mean, however, that the 
fiscal policy compliant with this rule is automatically optimal, since fulfilling the optimality 
condition also requires the appropriate initial deficit level. Thus, the expenditure growth rules 
should be applied together with some other rule which will provide the optimum deficit level 
in the period 0. Only then do these rules guarantee the policy that is socially optimal in the 
long run.  
5.  Role of the public capital 
So far in our considerations omitted was the distinction between the current and investment 
expenditure. This simplification does not affect the solution in the case of a developed country 
which has an appropriate level of public infrastructure. As it will be later proved, if the public 
capital  reaches  its  long  run  steady  state  level,  the  public  investment  expenditure  are 
approximately equal to the benefits which this capital brings. It means that time distribution of 
the  investment  expenditure  and  the  benefits  from  capital  are  the  same,  so  the  capital 
expenditure may be treated equally with the other primary expenditure (purchases of goods 
and service and transfers). Thus, introducing the public capital to the model does not affect 
the optimum solution.  
Different situation emerges if e.g. the level of the public capital provision is particularly low 
or  the  investment  expenditure  is  high.  Buiter  [2002]  indicates  that  this  situation  is 
characteristic of the developing countries. Higher investment needs of the public sector result 
from  too  low,  as  compared  to  the  needs,  amount  of  the  public  real  capital  (mainly  the 
infrastructure)  and  its  unsatisfactory  quality.  Extending  the  previous  analysis,  it  may  be 
shown  that  under  the  conditions  of  higher  investment  needs  of a developing country, the 
requirements concerning the optimal fiscal policy and the corresponding optimal fiscal rules 
may be differ from the previous outcome.  
A consequence of including the public capital in the analysis is changing the definition of the 
socially optimal policy, which is connected with different nature of advantages brought by the   21
capital. The current expenditure utility is immediate as opposed to the investment expenditure 
utility which is spread in time during the whole period of using the assets. Therefore, the 
social  benefits  resulting  from  the  government’s  activity  may  be  defined  as  the  sum  of 
transfers GT, the government consumption GC and the capital benefits. The level of the latter 
should be considered separately. 
Let us denote the real public capital level as K, and the capital depreciation rate as ￿. Since 
there are no reasons to assume that the public capital productivity is significantly higher or 
lower  than  the  average  capital  productivity  in  the  economy,  under  assumption  of  perfect 
capital markets, the gross (i.e. including depreciation) income from capital will be r + ￿. The 
distinctiveness of the public capital is that at least a part of its income is distributed among the 
society at no cost (as e.g. the access to public roads), whereas the other part may be paid for 
and increase the government income. If the government income of the public capital is ￿K, 
then the free of charge social benefits from the public capital are (r + ￿ – ￿)K. 
The overall social benefits connected with the fiscal activities may be, thus, presented as the 
sum of transfers, public consumption as well as the benefits connected with free access to the 
public  capital  K ) r ( G G Z C T e - d + + + = .  Analogically  to  the  previously  presented 
simplified approach, the socially optimal policy will be defined as the one which provides 
constant rate of the so defined benefits Z to GDP. The optimality criterion is, thus, satisfied by 
such an expenditure path where  
(32)  const k ) r ( g g z C T = e - d + + + = . 
The previously discussed model is extended with an additional equation of movement for the 
public  capital,  which  is  increased  through  the  public  investment  and  decreased  through 
depreciation:  
(33)  K G K I d - = ￿ . 
Analogically  as  in  the  previous  case,  it  can  be  proved  that  the  relative  capital  change 
according to the equation: 
(34)  k ) n ( g k I + d - = ￿ .  
On  the  income  side  besides  taxes,  we  should  include  the above mentioned public capital 
income ￿K. The relative deficit level (defined as the difference between the budget income 
and expenditure) is then expressed as:   22
(35)  k b ) r ( g g g d I C T e - t - p + + + + = . 
Applying the equations (20) and (34) to the deficit equation (35) we obtain: 
(36)  k ) n ( b ) n r ( g g b k C T e - d + - - - - - t = - ￿ ￿ . 
Using the equation (32) we obtain  z ) b k )( n r ( b k - t + - - = - ￿ ￿ . It should be noticed that the 
left side of the equation presents the change of the relative level of the net public assets – the 
value of capital net of debt. Let us denote the relative value of net public assets as w. Thus, 
the movement equation of this variable is given by:  
(37)  ) z ( w ) n r ( w - t + - = ￿ . 
With the assumption that the long run interest rate and the economic growth rate are different 
and constant, we obtain the differential equation. Analogically as in the previous part of the 
study, the group of solutions of this equation is expressed by: 
(38)   
t ) n r ( e
r n
z
) 0 ( w
r n
z
















) 0 ( w
-
- t
¹  and if in the typical case r >n, the above equation defines the exponential 
growth (decrease) path of the net public assets. This case means that the country endlessly 
runs into debt, or generates endlessly increasing (even in the ratio to GDP) assets. 
It  results  from  the  solvency  condition  and  the  dynamic  efficiency  condition  that 
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must also hold. In the light of the equation (41) the above condition may be fulfilled only 
when  ) r n /( ) z ( ) 0 ( w - - t = holds, which is synonymous with the condition  0 w = ￿ . Finally it 
shows, that the objective of the optimal fiscal policy is to shape the deficit and the share of 
investment expenditure in such a way that in any period the condition 
(40)  b k ￿ ￿ =     23
is  satisfied.  An  equal  distribution  of  the  benefits  (e.g.  between  the  generations)  from  the 
public expenditure is then guaranteed by a policy which aims at maintaining the constant 
value of the ratio of net public assets to gross domestic product.  
The above conclusions can be of crucial importance for the optimum fiscal policy problem in 
the case of developing countries. As mentioned earlier, these countries are often characterized 
by low level of infrastructure, which leads to high level of the public sector investment in the 
ratio to GDP, higher than in the case of developed countries. The presented analysis indicates 
that as long as the public investment leads to growth of the relative capital value, we can 
justify the growth of the relative debt level.  
According to the equation (34), under the conditions of low relative public capital level a 
given, constant level of the public investment causes the capital growth. However, together 
with the capital growth, the value of depreciation rises, which causes the ratio of the capital to 
GDP  to  asymptotically  converge  to  a  certain  steady  state  level  expressed  by  the  formula 
) n /( g k I L + d = . When the relative capital level k is close to kL, the growth of this variable 
becomes close to 0. A similar situation is more likely to be observed in developed countries 
than in the developing ones, where the optimality condition (40) takes the form  0 b k @ = ￿ ￿ . It 
is, thus, reduced to the rule presented earlier, according to which the optimum fiscal policy is 
shaping the deficit in a way that allows to maintain the ratio of debt–to-GDP constant. Thus, it 
may be assumed that the above presented considerations concerning the rules compliant with 
the  socially  optimal  policy  can  be  applied  in  the  case  of  developed  countries,  that  are 
characterized  by  a  high  saturation  with  the  public  capital.  Applying  the  presented 
considerations to the case of developing countries requires including effects of changes of the 
public capital level. 
In  the  case  of  developing  countries  with  underdeveloped  infrastructure,  the  policy  that  is 
optimal  under  the  conditions  of  a  developed  country  will  not  provide  an  appropriate 
distribution of benefits between the generations. High investment expenditure at a low deficit, 
means reducing the consumption of the current generation, while leaving higher resources to 
the future generations. The above presented analysis shows that the optimal policy under the 
conditions  of  a  developing  country  involve  a  partial  financing  of  the  capital  growth  by 
increasing the debt.   24
6.  The golden fiscal rule 
There emerges the problem of modifying the analyzed fiscal policy rules so that they comply 
with  the  defined  socially  optimal  policy.  In  the  case  of  the  deficit  rule  the  solution  is  a 
modification, according to which an additional investment expenditure can cause the rise of 
deficit. This rule is applied in a number of countries and is called the fiscal golden rule. It is 
most often formulated in the way that investment expenditure are off-budget and only the 
current  expenditure  (including  the  capital  depreciation)  should  be  covered  by  the  current 
income. Such rule can be expressed as:  K G D ˆ
I R d - £ . However, it may be easily shown that 
the rule does not guarantee pursuing the policy defined earlier as socially optimal, since it 
does not include the influence the economic growth has on the reduction of the relative debt 
level and public capital. The optimal solution is than provided rather by the modified golden 
rule which can be defined as: 
(41) 
'
R d ˆ d £ , where   0 k b : d ˆ '
R = - ￿ ￿ . 
According to this rule , the budget deficit should be set at the level at which the ratio of the 
net public assets to GDP remains constant. The deficit ceiling 
'
R d ˆ  depends in this case on two 
additional variables: the investment rate of the public sector and the relative value of the 
public capital.  
The  analysis  of  the  fiscal  rules  of  public  debt  with  public  capital  is  similar  to  the  case 
discussed earlier. Until the relative level is considerably lower than the ceiling, the public debt 
rule does not give any directives concerning shaping expenditure, which under the conditions 
of the previously discussed deficit bias may cause a rapid debt growth. When the debt level 
reaches the ceiling, however, the public debt rule forces the abrupt expenditure cuts. It is 
highly probable that this reduction may also influence the investment expenditure, which will 
considerably reduce the capital growth, indispensable in a developing economy.  
In turn, the expenditure growth rules may be a good alternative to the modified golden rule. 
As in the previous case, proper application of the rules depends on the appropriate choice of 
the key parameters – the initial expenditure level and the long run growth rate. A partial 
solution  of  this  problem  may  be  applying  the  modified  expenditure  rule  which  involves 
setting  constant  expenditure  growth  rate,  equal  the  income  growth  rate.  However,  such  a 
policy fulfills the optimality condition only if the relative deficit and investment expenditure 
levels are chosen so as the growths of capital- and debt-relative-to-GDP are equal.    25
7.  Summary and conclusions 
The performed analysis may be summarized in the following way: 
·  The subject of the analysis is the long run model of the public finance sector, with 
the intertemporal choice and infinite time horizon. In the basic model we try to find a 
policy  which  provides  the  optimum  distribution  of  expenditure  in  time.  Two 
alternative optimality criteria are considered: the one based on the utility function 
and  the  other,  based  on  assuming  constant  share  of  public  expenditure  in  GDP. 
Moreover, the optimal solution also has to satisfy the long run budgetary constraint, 
according  to  which  the  sum  of  the  future  discounted  income  has  to  allow  for 
financing the sum of the future discounted expenditure and the initial public debt. 
·  It is shown that the solution is the policy that maintains such a level of expenditure 
and deficit which provides the stabilization of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
·  It is assumed that there are reasons for which the real fiscal policy may deviate from 
the  socially  optimal  policy.  The  reason  that  the  deficit  is  higher  than  the  social 
optimum may be “fiscal illusion”, a conflict between the interest groups or between 
generations. Such a policy causes a loss in the social utility, and in the extreme case 
can end up with an uncontrolled growth of the public debt and insolvency of the 
public sector. 
·  A considered method to reduce the unfavorable activities of government involves 
applying the fiscal policy rules. Three groups of rules are analyzed, that refer to three 
crucial fiscal variables: deficit, public debt and expenditure. 
·  The first analyzed group are the deficit rules, that impose a constraint on the deficit-
to-GDP ratio. Among the three considered versions, the modified deficit rule seems 
to be the most promising. It involves the monitoring of the public debt level and such 
a choice of deficit that the debt–to-GDP ratio remains constant. Applying this rule 
does  not  require  knowledge  of  the  long  run  economic  growth  rate,  and  also 
guarantees that the chosen fiscal policy satisfies both the social optimality condition 
and the intertemporal budget constraint. 
·  Another analyzed group of rules are the debt ceilings, setting a constraint on the 
debt-to-GDP  ratio.  Their  effectiveness  in  fulfilling  the  objectives  depends  on  the 
level at which the ceiling is set. The debt rules guarantee optimal policy only when   26
the defined constraint equals the initial ratio of the debt to GDP – in this case the 
debt rule brings the same results as the modified deficit rule. If the debt constraint is 
defined at a level higher than the present one, then the result will be a excessively lax 
fiscal policy. As soon as the debt growth makes constraint binding, the rule forces a 
correction  being  a  sharp  reduction  of  the  expenditure,  which  is  almost  always 
unfavorable from the point of view of social utility. 
·  The last solution considered are the expenditure growth rules, the effects of which 
involves introducing the permissible rate of the overall expenditure growth. If the 
path is to make sense in the long run, this rate has to be the same as the long run 
GDP growth rate, which makes this method very sensitive to any possible estimation 
errors. The modified expenditure rule is devoid of this drawback – according to it the 
expenditure growth rate should equal a moving average of the past income growth 
rates.  This  approach  does  not  require  the  knowledge  of  the  long  run  economic 
growth rate but only observing the real income growth rate and making appropriate 
adaptations of the expenditure growth rate. However, if applying this rule is to lead 
to the socially optimal policy, it is necessary that another condition is fulfilled – the 
initial deficit level has to be socially optimal, i.e. it cannot cause the increase of the 
public debt–to-GDP ratio. 
·  The fiscal rules which are optimum in developed countries may lead to a sub-optimal 
solution in the case of developing countries. One of the reasons may be the observed 
low level of saturation with infrastructure and relatively high investment needs. To 
analyze  these  differences  the  model  extended  with  the  public  capital  was  also 
presented. The analysis shows that the optimum policy in such a model involves 
setting the investment expenditure and deficit at such level that growth of the public 
debt-to-GDP is the same as the growth of the public capital-to-GDP ratio. In other 
words, such a policy should maintain the fixed level of the net public assets as a 
share  of  GDP.  The  rule  which  guarantees  the  optimum  fiscal  policy  under  the 
existence of public capital is the modified golden rule.    27
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